forthcoming. On the importance of being robustly perspectival. Co-authored with Matt Bedke. Analysis

2016.  Sources, reasons, and requirements. Philosophical Studies. 173 (5): 1253 - 1268.

DOI  10.1007/s11098-015-0544-8


This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some—but not all—requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view—which I attribute to John Broome—normative requirements are those and only those which constitute or provide normative reasons. I argue that the reasons-providing view is susceptible to two serious objections. First, the view generates an explanatory gap. Secondly, the view is implausible. I argue that these two objections give us reason to prefer the reasons-sensitive view of normative requirements over the reasons-providing view.


2014. Sources, raisons et exigences. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The ethics forum. 9 (2): 152 - 165. 

Il existe de nombreuses sources d’exigences. Certaines exigences sont normatives dans la mesure où elles impliquent des affirmations concernant ce que nous avons raison de croire, faire, désirer, etc. À ce titre, les exigences morales sont parmi les meilleures candidates. Si la morale exige que l’on tienne notre promesse, il semble que nous avons une raison de la tenir. Cependant, ce ne sont pas toutes les exigences qui sont normatives en ce sens. Le catholicisme exige que l’on assiste à la messe chaque dimanche. Il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant que nous avons une raison d’y assister. Pourquoi cela? Pourquoi certaines exigences sont normatives en ce sens, mais pas d’autres? En vue de répondre à cette question, je défends la conception reasons-sensitive des exigences normatives, selon laquelle les exigences normatives sont celles et seulement celles qui sont sensibles aux raisons. Par contre, cette conception n’est pas la seule disponible. Selon ce que j’appelle la conception reasons-providing, les exigences normatives sont celles et seulement celles qui fournissent des raisons. Je soutiens que cette conception-ci est vulnérable à deux objections, ce qui nous donne raison de préférer la première.


  • Rationality and responding correctly to one's perspective

  • What's irrational about akrasia? 

  • Rationality and believing in normative dilemmas


According to a common conception, rationality is a source of consistency and coherence requirements governing certain relations among our mental states. On this view, rationality does not require that you have any particular beliefs or intentions. Rather, it requires that your beliefs and intentions be consistent, whatever their content. It is sometimes argued (and often assumed) that one such requirement is the enkratic requirement that you intend to do what you believe you ought to do. In this paper, I argue that there is a tension between this requirement and the common conception of rationality. I show that if the enkratic requirement is a rational requirement, then rationality cannot simply be a source of requirements that govern certain relations among our mental states. If the enkratic requirement is a rational requirement, then there is at least one beliefi.e the belief that you are faced with a normative dilemmasuch that if you have it, you are necessarily irrational, regardless of any other propositional attitude that you may hold. I end by suggesting that this gives us reason to reject the enkratic requirement as requirement of rationality.