My current research focuses on central issues in normativity and rationality. My main focus is on defending what Matt Bedke and I call "robust perspectivalism", the view according to which rationality strongly supervenes on one's non-factive mental states. This is done against the backdrop of a factive turn in theories on rationality, which take rationality to consist in correctly responding to normative reasons (or some precisification of the view).
Another current interest is the relation between epistemic and practical akrasia on the one hand, and rationality on the other. My aim is to show that, while there is something distinctively wrong about akratic belief and behaviour, what goes wrong in akratic belief and behaviour is not the akratic agent’s rationality. In doing so, I aim to shed light on not only the nature of akrasia, but on the nature of rationality and morality, more generally.
I am also interested in issues in epistemology, applied ethics, and in classical, modal, and deontic logic.