My current research focuses on central issues in normativity and rationality. I am interested in both the scope and normative status of rational requirements, as well as how we (should) differentiate rational requirements from other kinds of requirements the world imposes on us.
The view of rationality that I develop and defend in various papers takes the notion of a normative reason to occupy a fundamental role in explaining the normative status of rationality. As such, my current research lends itself to a broader and more programmatic project in the philosophy of normativity, which attempts to explain all normative phenomena in terms of normative reasons. I'm interested in determining whether this kind of fundamentalism about reasons can make good on its claim.
Another current interest is the relation between epistemic and practical akrasia on the one hand, and rationality on the other. My aim is to show that, while there is something distinctively wrong about akratic belief and behaviour, what goes wrong in akratic belief and behaviour is not the akratic agent’s rationality. In doing so, I aim to shed light on not only the nature of akrasia, but on the nature of rationality and morality, more generally.
I am also interested in issues in epistemology, applied ethics, and in classical, modal, and deontic logic.